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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the court below properly instruct the jury on the

measure of damages?
2.

Was the verdict supported by substantial evidence and

application of the law?
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

During 1984, the State of Utah entered into negoti-

ations with plaintiffs to acquire a strip of property along the
frontage of the Carpet Barn for a highway widening project.
(T-14.)
2.

Plaintiffs refused the State's offer to purchase the

strip of property and the road widening plans were altered to
go around plaintiffs' property.
3.

(T-20, T-74.)

The Carpet Barn structure was constructed 20 feet from

the State's right-of-way line and 38 feet from the traveled
way.

(T-114; 275.)
4.

Patrons of the Carpet Barn used the State's right-of-

way to maneuver their vehicles for parking in front of the business, prior to the construction project.
5.

(T-44-45; 48.)

As part of the road widening project the State con-

structed a retaining wall across the front of plaintiffs'
property along the right-of-way boundary where the property
began to slope down to the Carpet Barn structures.

(T-15.)

6.

The wall was topped by a chain link fence which was

subsequently removed.
7.

(T-36.)

When the construction project was completed it was

discovered that the footings encroached on plaintiffs' property
approximately 6 inches.
8.

(T-292.)

The plaintiffs1 southern property boundary was 20 feet

from the building structure allowing for a 20 foot wide driveway which ran from Redwood Road to the rear of the structure.
(T-7; 281.)
9.

The access to plaintiffs' property was unreasonable

both before the construction project and after its completion.
(T-234-235.)
10.

At the completion of the project/ parallel parking

spaces were in place along the frontage of the Carpet Barn
property

(T. 52).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The jury was properly instructed on the measure of severance damages, i.e., the value of the remaining property before
the taking minus the value of the remaining property after the
taking.

The jury properly applied those instructions to the

evidence offered by the State's engineer and the State's
appraiser.
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Plaintiffs1 "theory of the case" was adequately presented
by the instructions when read and considered as a whole and by
the evidence offered by plaintiffs and defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant State of Utah seeks an order affirming the jury
verdict below.
ARGUMENT
I
THE JURY CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
COURT WITH REGARD TO CALCULATION OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES
AND THEIR VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED.
The jury considered and applied the parameters set forth in
Instruction No. 15 in calculating severance damages.

The

instruction required consideration of the value of the remaining property before the severance of the part acquired and the
value of the remaining property after severance.

The figures

ultimately returned by the jury included the value of the land
taken, the value attributable to the construction easement, and
an amount representing severance damages to the remaining
property.

(T-292.)

Defendant's appraiser testified that the value of the property (which included land and buildings) prior to the taking
was $306,000.00, based on a combination of the market, cost and
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income approaches.

(T-271 to 292.)

He further testified that

the property had suffered a depreciation, not from physical
deterioration, but from functional obsolescence which he
explained to be problems inherent in the building as originally
constructed.

(T-280 to 281.)

He applied a penalty or set-off

for aspects existing in the structure which would not be built
into a new structure.

The functional obsolescence already

existed prior to the taking.

(T-293.)

The value of the

property was therefore the same both before and after the
taking.

(T-280.)

Two of the three buildings which comprised the structure on
the Carpet Barn property were constructed in the early 1950*s
for the purpose of manufacturing munitions.

(T-278.)

The

highest and best use at the time of construction was manufacturing.

(T-282.)

The highest and best use currently is

qualified commercial or warehouse commercial, as distinguished
from typical retail commercial property.

(T-272 to 278.)

The buildings were constructed 20 feet from the south
boundary of the property, allowing a 20 foot drive for access
to the rear of the buildings.

The 20 foot access would have

been easy to close off and control and may have been so limited
at the time of construction for security reasons.

(T-281.)

The buildings were constructed 20 feet from the west
boundary of the property (the right-of-way line) and 38 feet
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from the traveled way.

(T-275.) When the property was con-

verted from manufacturing use to commercial use, the owner was
faced with the problem of parking because "commercial use
doesn't generally exist with parking solely in the rear."
(T-282.)

The problem was resolved at the time by simply using

the State's right of way for parking and access or, in effect,
"borrowing" the parking in the front.

(T-282.) When the State

elected to use its full right-of-way, the problem did not
change.

It was inherent in the property when its use changed

from manufacturing to commercial.

The State did not create the

problem, but at the time it elected to utilize its existing
right-of-way, the functional obsolescence which had previously
existed since the time the use had changed from manufacturing
to commercial became operational.

(T-292 to 293.)

As testified by defendant's appraiser, the functional
obsolescence was not caused by the "taking", but was caused by
the change from manufacturing to commercial use.

Therefore,

the actual value of the property was the same before the
"taking" as it was after the "taking."

(T-280.)

Defendant's appraiser considered the fact that after the
State used its right-of-way and plaintiffs could no longer use
the State's property, the unusable strip of land in front of
the buildings which had previously been used for parking,
should be "cleaned up" and could be used more aesthetically by
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undergoing some landscaping which he valued at $4,543.00.
(T-293 to 294.)

He reasoned that when plaintiffs could no

longer borrow the State's property to provide parking, the best
use of the remaining strip belonging to plaintiffs would be to
improve the face of the building.

When the retaining wall was

constructed there remained a "kind of hole" in front of the
building which Mr. Lang did not feel was desirable from a
retail standpoint.

He felt that the landscaping should be done

to clean up the effects of the construction and to put the
unusable strip of property to some useful purpose, which in his
opinion would increase the value of the entire remaining property to at least what it had been prior to the "taking."
(T-333 to 334.)

He therefore determined that the difference in

value of the remaining property before the "taking" and after
the "taking" was $4,543.00 or the cost of making the unusable
strip of land functional again.

(T-324.)

Plaintiffs suggest that the entire basis for Mr, Lang's
conclusion was a hearsay statement made by Mr. Beaufort,
another State expert, which was later contradicted in Court.
The statement pertained to the access enjoyed by plaintiffs
prior to the State's utilization of the right-of-way and was
taken completely out of context when quoted in plaintiffs'
brief.

Mr. Beaufort's testimony at trial was not inconsistent

with the out-of-court statement relied upon by Mr. Lang.
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Mr. Lang testified that one of the factors he considered in his
analysis was a statement made by Mr. Beaufort that plaintiffs
did not have access across the frontage of the property prior
to the taking.

(T-315.)

In response to both direct exami-

nation and cross-examination, Mr. Beaufort stated that the
"access" to the Carpet Barn property was unreasonable both
before the "taking" (T-234) and after the "taking" (T-235).
His opinion that the access before the taking was unreasonable
is explained as follows:
A.
I base that upon the only access to the property;
the property in general that I would recognize as an
access, was the 20 foot driveway, a 20 foot driveway
that will operate for commercial use and industrial
use; i.e., trucks and cars at the same time, 20 foot
wide access is inadequate.
(T-234.) When asked whether he was aware that customer parking
was available in front of the Carpet Barn complex prior to completion of the project, Mr. Beaufort responded that he was
aware that vehicles were utilizing the frontage and the rightof-way in front of the building, and that he considered that
fact in arriving at his opinion.

(T-235.)

Even though Mr. Beaufort was aware of the 200 foot frontage
distance at the property prior to the taking, he did not consider that to be "access," and stated that despite that awareness "there was no improved access or control of access
(T-253 to 254.)

....

It became apparent on cross-examination that

Mr. Beaufort's definition of the term access differed from that
of plaintiffs1 counsel:
Q.
Perhaps we ought to maybe define some terms.
When I use the term "access" — and I'm not an
engineer, sir — what I'm saying is: Were you made
aware of the fact that for a substantial number of
years, in fact, 1972 until 1985, that customers of the
Carpet Barn drove from Redwood Road on to the Carpet
Barn property and parked in front?
A.
Yes, I was aware that they were parking and
maneuvering on the right-of-way.
Q.
That's what I mean when I say "access." In other
words, you can go from point A to point B along a 200
foot frontage piece of property, correct?
A.

You're saying a 200 foot driveway?

Q.
Right, exactly.
of that?
A.

Now, you say that you were aware

Yes.

Mr. Sessions went on to discuss whether the area was traversible and Mr. Beaufort's testimony in that regard was partially
quoted in Plaintiffs' brief.

It's full context is as follows:

Q.
Do you know of any law, any regulation, any
directive, that says that a customer of the Carpet
Barn parking in 20 feet of property can't back out
onto Redwood Road and proceed North or South over the
State's right-of-way?
A.
If its transversible [sic], I believe there is —
there is transversible [sic]. There is no law that
says you cannot do that. In the State Regulations, to
my understanding, that right-of-way cannot be used for
parking and maneuvering of vehicles. The landowner —
that information is available to the landowner. But
if it's transversible [sic], then I'm sure that vehicles would utilize it.
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Mr. Beaufort conceded that if the property were traversible, vehicles would utilize it.

He did not concede that the

200 foot frontage provided legal access, improved access, or
control of access and clearly distinguished between use of the
property and legal "access" or improved "access" to the
property.
Mr. Lang also qualified his testimony by stating:
A.
I don't know whether the State had the right to
control access there or not. I'm not an expert in
these things. I appraised this property the way it
is. (Emphasis added.)
(T-315.) Mr. Lang was clearly referring to a legal right to
access and not actual physical use of the right of way.

He

Stated several times that the plaintiffs borrowed public
property for access to their parking (T-282) and that he did
not know what they were entitled to in the law.

(T-324.)

His

calculations were based on what they had before and what they
had after (T-325), which was a problem that always existed;
when parking was constricted from the time the property became
retail.

(T-325.)

The New Mexico Supreme Court in City of Albuquerque vChapman, 76 N.M. 162, 413 P.2d 204 (1966) stated:
[O]pinion by real estate appraisers on "before and
after" market values must be considered in connection
with related facts on which they are based, and a
satisfactory explanation must be given as to how the
witness arrived at his conclusion.

-9-

Id. at 208 (citing Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Ptak, 236
Ark. 105, 364 S.W.2d 794 (1963)).

In Chapman, supra, it was

determined that the appraiser's testimony was based entirely on
inaccurate dimensions and mathematical calculations as well as
undeveloped reasoning.

In this case both the State's appraiser

and the State's engineer gave satisfactory explanations of the
facts on which they relied and the bases of their calculations.
Each expert testified that his opinions and calculations were
based on what access the plaintiffs had before the taking and
what they had after the taking.

It should not be overlooked in

the context of this discussion that plaintiffs' experts offered
their own opinions on the issue of reasonableness of access to
the property before and after the taking.

(T-103.)

Rebuttal

and further argument were also available regarding the weight
to be given such testimony.
The jury apparently agreed with the State's experts that
although the property was traversible before the taking, plaintiffs did not have improved access or control of access before
the taking and therefore there was no unreasonable interference, impairment or restriction of plaintiffs' right of access
when the frontage strip could no longer be used for parking.
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II
THE JURY RELIED ON THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES AND THE STATE'S ESTIMATE OF
DAMAGES WAS ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
The testimony of defendant's appraiser was based on a
calculation of value prior to the taking minus the value after
the taking, and was not based on a "cost to cure" analysis.
Mr. Lang did discuss the cost to cure a functional obsolescence
existing in the property prior to the taking in addressing one
possible option to provide additional parking.

However, the

jury award did not include that figure and he did not testify
that the cost to cure that functional obsolescence affected his
calculation of the difference in value before and after the
taking for the purposes of an award of severance damages.
(T-325 to 327; 332 to 333.) Mr. Lang testified that the
property had been devalued by the existence of the functional
obsolescence prior to the taking.

(T-280 to 281; 293.)

Plaintiffs argue that the verdict in this case is contrary
to Utah law and cite Utah Dep't of Transportation v. Rayco
Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979), stating that testimony offered
by the State in this case is nearly identical to that rejected
by this Court in Rayco.
In Rayco, supra, the State's estimate of severance damages,
which was based on the cost of acquiring additional land and
using that land for parking (cost to cure) was adopted by the

jury.

This Court held that "the proper measure of severance

damages to the remainder is the difference between the fair
cash market value before and after the taking."

Id. at 489

(citing State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 321, 366 P.2d 76
(1961)).
In this case the jury verdict was not based on a compromised cost to cure the plaintiffs* parking problem.

All of the

testimony offered with regard to cost to cure the parking
problem was simply incidental testimony of calculations and
alternatives to cure the pre-existing functional obsolescence
and related to resolution of the parking problem.

The testi-

mony offered regarding landscaping had nothing to do with
curing the parking problem but was offered as a direct alternative to increasing the value of the unusable parking strip to
something useful.
In awarding $4,543.00 as severance damages, the jury
adopted the opinion of defendant's expert that the value of the
property had decreased by that amount when plaintiffs no longer
had the benefit of the use of public property for their parking
and an alternative for making the then unusable strip of land
of some use and value would be to landscape it at a cost of
$4,543.00.

Mr. Lang did not consider that amount to be an

improvement cost, but the cost to reestablish that strip of
property to some useful purpose and to "clean up" after the
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construction project.

Mr. Lang testified that "$5,425.00 is

the difference between what he had before and what he has now
in my opinion."

(T-324.)

The testimony offered by the State regarding remedying the
parking situation was with regard to curing the preexisting
functional obsolescence and was not intended as an alternative
"cure" for the taking.

The State did not attempt to introduce

"cost to cure" evidence as a measure of severance damages for
the taking and the jury did not adopt the "cost to cure" the
parking problem as a measure of severance damages.

Mr. Lang

attempted to clarify this in response to a question posed by
plaintiffs' counsel:
A.
I think you are mixing up cost to cure damages
with curable functional obsolescence. And curable
functional obsolescence relates to the value of the
property, specifically the value of the buildings.
And that occurred when the use changed from manufacturing to retail.
Curable functional obsolescence is what I'm
talking about here. I am saying whoever bought the
property and used it for retail had a parking problem. At any time they knew the State could do what
it's done. So they had to solve the problem somehow.
I would say and have said that an informed buyer would
have made a deduction for that fact when he bought the
property. I don't know if they did. I assume they
did.
(T-332, 333.)

The "cost to cure" testimony related only to

curing the preexisting functional obsolescence and not to the
value of the property.
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By awarding the cost of landscaping as severance damages,
plaintiffs were put in as good a financial position as they
were in before the taking in terms of the property they owned
and were legally entitled to use.

Plaintiffs are merely

disappointed that the jury did not adopt the estimate of
severance damages advocated by their appraiser,
III
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE LAW.
The evidence presented during the course of the trial,
together with the instructions given by the Court, adequately
addressed the plaintiffs' theory of the case and the appropriate measure of damages.
Plaintiffs object to the failure of the Court to give
plaintiffs1 proposed Instruction No. 26:
You are instructed that the evidence in this case is
that the State of Utah did not attempt, in any way, to
restrict highway access of the Carpet Barn property
until August, 1985.
The basis of the objection was that the instruction was
necessary to give the jury a starting point to calculate
severance damages.

The calculation of severance damages,

however, requires a determination of the value of the property
before the taking as compared to the value after the taking,
and plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how proposed
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Instruction No. 26 would have been relevant to their appraiser's determination of the value of the property before and
after the taking.

Likewise, whether the State ever attempted

to utilize its right of way prior to the date of the actual
taking is not relevant or significant to the calculation of
severance damages.

There was ample evidence presented

regarding the dates of construction and the configuration of
the property before and after the taking.
Furthermore, plaintiffs" proposed Instruction No. 26 was
not necessary to the utilization of other instructions or the
calculation of severance damages.

This is amply demonstrated

by the multiple references to the prohibition against unreasonable interference, impairment or restriction of right of access
in the instructions given, including Nos. 18, 20, and 21. As
plaintiffs recognize and state in their brief, jury
instructions must be read and considered as whole.
Plaintiffs also object to the elimination of language from
their proffered Instruction Nos. 25 and 28. Both of those
instructions eliminated the language "established by long-term
use or travel" in discussing rights of ingress and egress.
Plaintiffs relied on § 27-12-134, Utah Code Ann., in formulating the instructions proffered.

That statute states:

27-12-134, Authorities may regulate, require permit
and security for excavation or construction Limitation on authority.
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Except as otherwise provided in section 54-4-15,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the highway authorities of
the state, counties, cities, and towns are authorized
to adopt regulations, and may require a permit containing reasonable terms and conditions, for the crossing,
digging-up, or the placement, construction, and maintenance of approach roads, driveways, structures, poles,
pipelines, conduits, sewers, ditches, culverts, facilities, or any other structures or objects of any kind
or character on the public highway rights-of-way under
their respective jurisdiction. Said highway authorities may require a surety bond or other reasonable
security which may be forfeited in the event the
regulations or the conditions of a permit are breached.
The authority granted by this section shall not
be exercised so as to deny reasonable ingress and
egress to property adjoining a public highway except
where said highway authorities have acquired such
right of ingress and egress by gift, agreement, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise or where no right
of ingress or egress exists between the right-of-way
and the adjoining property.
That statute does not contain the language eliminated from the
instruction by the Court, and the elimination was therefore
appropriate.
The instructions, when read as a whole, adequately reflect
plaintiffs1 theory of the case as well as the state of the law.
IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE
OF THE CHAIN LINK FENCE AND EVIDENCE OF
ACCESS ALLOWED OTHER PROPERTIES.
As plaintiffs have indicated, they are entitled to
introduce evidence of the value of the property at its highest
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and best use as of the date of the taking and did so at trial
through the testimony of their own experts.
Defendant is also entitled to introduce evidence of the
value of the property at its highest and best use as of the
date of the taking.

According to defendant's appraiser, the

highest and best use at the date of the taking was not for
commercial property as alleged by the plaintiffs, but for
qualified commercial property or warehouse commercial
property.

(T-277.)

That opinion was based on the fact that

the property had only a 20 foot drive on its south side and in
order to provide parking at the front of the building as
required for a highest and best use of commercial status, the
plaintiffs were required to "borrow" public property.
As stipulated at the time of trial, and as the instructions
reflect, the appropriate measure of damages for the taking of
plaintiffs1 property is the value of the remaining property
before the taking minus the value of the remaining property
after the taking.

The chain link fence was a temporary obstruc-

tion which was removed after it was erected and prior to the
time of trial.

The trial court correctly determined that such

evidence was irrelevant in calculating the value of the remaining property prior to the taking as compared to the value of
the remaining property after the taking.

In spite of that

fact, the testimony adduced by plaintiffs at trial contained

multiple references to the fence, in the testimony of both Ken
MacQueen (T-36) and Jack DeMass (T-101-104).

That testimony

also failed to demonstrate how such evidence is relevant to
valuation of the property as of the date of the taking.
The Court also properly excluded evidence as to access
afforded other properties.

The issue of reasonable access as

it impacts on determining the amount of severance damages is
dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case.

Absent a showing of "complete similarity" the circum-

stances of neighboring properties would be inadmissible.
v. Christensen, 371 P.2d 552, 556 (Utah 1962).

State

In the instant

case, no such showing was made with respect to elevation,
setbacks, improved structures, depth and width of property,
etc.

As noted above, plaintiffs presented extensive evidence

on the issue of reasonable access as it affects their
individual parcel.
V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
A NEW TRIAL.
In this case, the evidence received by the Court was
properly applied under the instructions given and justified the
verdict returned by the jury.

The State's expert testified as

to his opinion regarding the value of the Carpet Barn property
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and the jury adopted the opinion of the State's expert,
Mr. Lang testified that the addition of landscaping to the face
of the Carpet Barn property would bring the property after the
taking to the same value that it possessed prior to the
taking.

(T-310.)

The jury applied that law as to the

calculation of values to the testimony of Mr. Lang and
determined that the difference in value could be adequately
remedied by the landscape improvement which would cost
$4,543.00.
A new trial is not warranted except for some basic and
compelling reason.

In Uptown Appliance and Radio Company v.

Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1952), this Court Stated at p. 829:
Jury trials are a part of the fundamental tenets of
our judicial system and where, as in this case, a
litigant has fully, completely and without restraint,
been permitted to show his full grievance to a jury
and they have conscientiously and without any showing
of prejudice or other extraneous influences decided
the matter, there must be some basic and compelling
reasons so inherent in the evidence that the trial
judge would be warranted in placing his judgment as to
the result to be reached over and above that of the
jury.
No such basic and compelling reasons have been established by
plaintiffs' counsel.

In fact, a careful review of the evidence

shows at most conflicting testimony, the force and effect of
which it is for the jury to weigh in arriving at a verdict.
Where conflicting evidence has been presented, if reasonable minds could have found as the jury did from the evidence
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before it, that is sufficient to support the verdict.
Pollesche v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 497 P.2d 236, 238
(Utah 1972).
In this case, the conflicting evidence relates to the value
of plaintiffs' property before and after the "taking" of a
small portion of their property.

Plaintiffs argue that because

the jury awarded the amount of severance damages to which Mr.
Lang testified the jury misunderstood and misapplied the law as
to severance damages.

Mr. Lang's testimony with respect to

landscaping costs as severance damages was received without
objection and specifically reflected the difference in value of
the property before and after the "taking", as illustrated on
Exhibit 49-D, summarizing Mr. Lang's testimony.

Merely because

the jury rejected conflicting testimony is no indication that
they misapplied the law or were influenced by inadmissible
evidence.
In addition, plaintiffs' counsel during closing argument
invited the jury to award Mr. Lang's proposed figures as
damages if they did not adopt those proposed by plaintiffs'
expert.

He cannot now argue that such an award was

inappropriate.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff'!, win r ijivon an opportunity to thoroughly litigate
their claim at the time of trial and to receive the jury's
decision thereon.

The evidence submitted aiui I lo~ instruct ions

pi opoujideil lo i IIH iury adequately reflected plaintiffs' theory
iif the case,

This Court should not disturb the jury's

conclusion merely on t he I", if-:; i s that i easoriab 1 *:j m1 rids mi cjhiH
differ as to the outcome.

Plaintiffs have had a full and fair

opportunity to present all evidence and arguments in support of
their posit; ion to t he "iury, and the iury veniiot sliould not be
disturbed.
The trial Court also appropriately denied plaintiffs'"
request for an additur,

I'he Court, is not empowered to enter-

tain a motion for an additur when the damages are not so
inadequate as to indicate a disregard nf lhe evidence by the
•jury.

The jury's award was well within the testimony and evidence
presented at trial

the ]in y was adequate Iy iny'vuoted, and

v erdict snou i d ue dIf i rmed.
Respectfully submitted this

3j^av of

August

SNOW, CHRISTENS EN

19 88.

-

By
Jody K/ Burnett
Attoriyeys^for Defendant
SCMAXS215
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ADDENDUM

PLAINTIFFS'

PROPOSEI

Nos . 2 5 ,

26,

11 ' TRIJCTJONS
2b

/

INSTRUCTION MO.

iP

The State has authority to adopt and enforce regulations
governing the use of and access to public highway rights of way,
i n c I u d i n g i' e g-111 a 11 c n s g o v e n I i n g t:he ] o c a t i on,, numb e r an d wi d th o f
driveways providing access to and from adjoining land,

However,

the State is prohibited by law from exercising this authority in
a w,iy rhat:

.i* ' rres

with or impairs an established

right of ingress and egress r .-* property adjoining a public highway .
Where art owner of adjoining land has rights of ingress and
egress to a public highway

OQ

t p ^ 1 i-F^fl by l ^ g - ^ ^ g H Q P m» t-rgirol

and those rights are unrpasunably inpairerl by th*-- adoption cf
State regulations or the enforcement of those regulations, that
owner is entitled to just compensation by vsv oi severance
damages for the i mreasonabl e restrict:] ox i of 1:

• ; p-ht of access.

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-134

INSTRUCTION NO.

U^

You are instructed that the evidence in this case is that
the State of Utah did not attempt in any way to restrict highway
access of the Carpet Barn property until August 1985.

Jjp

INSTRUCTION MO.

""v- rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant

me

±ancl Qf

an

abutting owner on a street;

they consti-

tute property rights forming part of t:he ownei: I s es tate

These

substantial property rights, although subject
to reasonaoie
reasonable
ect to

j

regu Laiiion „ may not IIH raken away or i impaired bv the State

A
without the payment of just compensation.
Where
prope

ir. connection with an actual taking of an abutting
• *

« • , ;;t_rt , tl le erection of a permanei it structure

as a part of a public highway results in the impairment of or
damage to the abutting property owner's easements of access,
light

-i n * I d i v e4^rtb4-i^e4--by—te«g -time—fcr-+*w4»--e^--*«-»-r* r h ar

damage or impairment are relevant factors properly considered in
determining severance damages•
Utah State Road Commission
vs. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah

1974);
Utah Road Commission vs.
Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383
P.2d 917 (1963).

INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN

INSTRUCTION NO.

The State has authority

"2. O

to adopt and enforce

regulations

governing the use of and access to piiliil i c highway rights of way,
including regulations governing the location, number and width of
driveways providing access * - anc from adjoining land.
the State -

However,

••om exercising this authority in

a wav that- treasonably interferes with or impairs an established
righ"

*•

digress

and

egress

to

property

/J9

highway.

adjoi ning

a

pu bile

fi&Cl&#

Where an owner of adjoining land has rights of ingress and
egress

to

a public

highway

and

those ri ghts are unreasoi lably

Impaired by the adopti on of State regulations or the enforcement
of those regulations, that owner is entitled to just compensation
by way of severance damages for the unreasoiiabl e restriction of
his right, •; t at res.1

INSTRUCTION NO.

The

rights

of

access,

light,

and

air

are

easements

appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they
constitute property rights forming part of the owner's estate.
These substantial property rights, although subject to reasonable
regulation, may not be taken away or unreasonably impaired by the
State without the payment of just compensation.
Where, in connection with an actual taking of an abutting
property owner's property, the erection of a permanent structure
as a part of a public highway results in the impairment of or
damage to the abutting property owner's easements of access,
light, and air, that damage or impairment are relevant factors
properly considered in determining severance damages.

^

EXHIBIT 49D
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